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0. Introduction      
In this paper, I seek to explore two related questions: (i) Can we adequately account for all the 
distributional properties of PRO, in other words, can we provide a principled explanation for 
its distribution? (ii) Can PRO escape methodological considerations of simplicity and 
economy that have become measures of theory evaluation within the Minimalist Program?   
      Under the Government and Binding (GB) approach to linguistic theory, the distribution of 
the phonetically null subject of infinitivals, PRO, was accounted for in terms of government, 
an essential grammatical relation of the GB framework. Given the requirement of the PRO 
Theorem that PRO must be ungoverned and the conception of government as a prerequisite 
for Case assignment, PRO was assumed to lack Case. Certain conceptual and empirical 
problems of this approach led to the proposal of an alternative Case-theoretic view on the 
distribution of PRO, namely that it bears null Case, a special Case that is restricted to PRO 
and can only be checked by nonfinite Infl in a Spec-head relation. 
      With the development of the Minimalist Program (MP), many of the basic concepts of the 
previous GB framework are reexamined in an attempt to find more suitable solutions and 
answers concerning fundamental properties of the human language faculty. Crucially, within 
MP an emphasis is placed on notions such as economy, elegance and simplicity as key factors 
in evaluating a theory. In particular, economy principles in terms of least effort conditions and 
methodological concerns are held to be essential criteria of an adequate theory. These 
minimalist ideas induce a reanalysis of the status of PRO and the whole Control module, and 
lead to the proposal of the movement theory of control, which dispenses with PRO and other 
theoretical concepts responsible for explaining its properties. The basis for such a move 
comes from viewing PRO as a theory internal formative, bearing properties that are quite 
distinct from those of other nominal elements.  
      In chapter 1, I discuss how the distribution-of-PRO problem is viewed under the GB 
framework, followed by a description of the null Case theory as formulated within early 
versions of minimalism. In chapter 2, I introduce Hornstein’s movement theory of control and 
investigate some problems that the theory raises. In chapter 3, I outline a current minimalist 
analysis of PRO, and in chapter 4, some suggestions for further research are provided. 
 
Chapter 1: PRO and Case Theory 
In this chapter, I discuss issues related to the distribution of PRO: in section 1. 1., I review the 
GB approach to PRO; in section 1. 2., the problems posed by the GB analysis and the null 
Case theory are described; in section 1. 3., I outline Martin’s (2001) version of the null Case 
approach.  
1. 1. The Distribution of PRO and the Binding Theory 
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A fundamental concept of the GB approach is government, a structural configuration defined 
in terms of a mutual c-command relation between a governor α (that is a head) and an element 
β that is governed. Within GB, both Case-assignment and θ-marking take place under 
government, the former at the level of S-structure (SS), the latter at D-structure (DS). 
      Under standard accounts of the framework (Chomsky 1981, 1982, 1986a), the 
distributional properties of PRO are crucially determined by the notion of government, 
specifically by the principle below:  
(1) PRO Theorem   
PRO must be ungoverned. 
The PRO Theorem is deduced from Principle A and Principle B of the Binding Theory, a 
module of GB that is responsible for interpreting the referential properties of nominal 
elements: 
(2) a. Principle A: An anaphor must be bound in its governing category. 
b. Principle B: A pronoun must be free in its governing category. 
The notion governing category (GC) is defined as follows: α is a governing category for β if 
and only if α is the minimal IP, NP containing β and a governor for β; the expressions 'free' 
and 'bound' are construed in terms of a relationship that involves c-command and co-indexing 
between two categories, that is, a relation between α and β where α binds β in case α c-
commands β and they are co-indexed. In effect, β is bound in its GC when it must be 
governed within its GC, and free when it is not governed within its GC.  
      Given the binding principles in (2), the theorem in (1) is derived as follows: Chomsky 
(1981, 1982, 1986a) argues that PRO shares some features with anaphors in that it has no 
specific independent reference, but it is also like pronouns in that it need not have an 
antecedent – therefore the properties of PRO are specified as [+ anaphor, + pronominal]. As a 
pronominal anaphor, PRO has to satisfy both Principle A and B of the Binding Theory: it 
must be both bound and free in its GC, a conflicting requirement which PRO can only escape 
if it lacks a GC and hence a governor, thereby not violating the principles of the Binding 
Theory. From this reasoning follows the condition on PRO that it must be ungoverned. 
Additionally, given the PRO Theorem in (1), PRO is assumed to lack Case, as Case-marking 
takes place under government within GB. Chomsky (1995) justifies these assumptions with 
empirical data:  
(3) a. *we found PRO 
b. *it seems [PRO to be intelligent] 
c. John tried [PRO to defend Mary]. 
In (3a), PRO occurs in a position that is both governed and Case-marked, whereas in (3b) 
Case cannot be assigned to the position where PRO appears, but the position is governed; 
hence the ungrammaticality of the examples. (3c) is an acceptable sentence, as the position 
which PRO occupies is ungoverned, indicating that nonfinite Infl is not a governor for PRO. It 
should be noted, however, that there is a contrast between (3b) and (3c): why is PRO 
governed by the matrix verb in (3b), but not in (3c), given that the structure of the two 
sentences seems to be the same? Chomsky (1986b) provides a solution in terms of barriers: 
the embedded clause following the matrix verb in (3c) is CP, hence a barrier to government of 
PRO by the verb tried; by contrast, the clausal complement following seems in (3b) is IP, 
which is not a barrier to government of PRO by the matrix verb. 
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      These empirical facts seem to indicate that the PRO Theorem provides an adequate 
account for the distributional properties of PRO; nevertheless, by broadening the empirical 
coverage, we will see that the issue is more complicated than it first appeared. 
1. 2. PRO and Null Case 
One of the puzzles posed in connection with the proposal, pointed out by Chomsky (1995), is 
related to the principle which attempts to integrate the Case Filter, a criterion that every 
lexical argument NP be Case-marked, with Theta Theory (Chomsky 1981). This principle, 
dubbed as the Visibility Condition by Chomsky (1986a), maintains that an argument chain 
(which is formed by the operation Move α) must contain a Case-position in order to be visible 
for θ-marking. As PRO is a θ-marked argument but lacks Case on the assumption that it is 
ungoverned, it violates the Visibility Condition. This in turn requires a conceptually 
undesirable modification of the Visibility Condition (which, moreover, does not solve the 
problem): a chain must contain a Case-position or must be headed by PRO in order to be 
visible for θ-role assignment. 
      Another conceptual reason for reconsidering the analysis presented in the previous section 
is related to the structure of infinitivals that contain PRO (see Hornstein, Nunes and 
Grohmann 2005). PRO ocuppies exactly the same position in the tree where a lexical subject 
NP occurs in a finite clause, i.e. the specifier position of nonfinite Infl. A lexical NP in the 
Spec position of a finite Infl is assigned nominative Case and governed by the Infl head, 
assuming a definition of government in terms of m-command (where α m-commands β if and 
only if α is a head and m-commands β). This said, on the null hypothesis PRO should also be 
governed under m-command by nonfinite Infl; nevertheless, to maintain the assumption that 
PRO is ungoverned, a distinction is made between finite Infl and nonfinite Infl within GB: 
arguably, it is posited that nonfinite Infl cannot govern.  
      Additionally, an empirical problem is posed by the fact that PRO, just like any other Case-
marked argument, has to move from a position where no Case is assigned, and is not 
permitted to move from a position that is Case-marked, as the examples given by Chomsky 
(1995) illustrate:  
(4) a. We never expected [PROi to be found ti]. 
b.  *It is unfair [PROi to talk about ti]. 
In (4a) PRO moves from a non-Case position. (4a) alone does not pose a serious challenge to 
the analysis presented in the previous section: the movement of PRO could be accounted for 
under the assumption that as PRO must be ungoverned, its movement from a governed to an 
ungoverned position in (4a) is tolerated by the grammar and yields an acceptable result. In 
(4b), however, where PRO moves from a position that is both governed and Case-marked, the 
result is ill-formed: this shows that PRO, just like any other overt argument NP that must bear 
Case, cannot move from a position where Case is assigned, even if this move would protect 
PRO from being governed. Note that (4b) is incorrectly predicted to be grammatical by the 
assumption inherent in (1) that such a move should in general be licit. 
      The above considerations lead Chomsky (1995) to propose that PRO is indeed always 
Case-marked, just like any other argument NP, but its Case is distinct from the standard Cases 
that ordinary NPs bear: PRO is marked for null Case, a special Case that can only be realized 
by PRO and is licensed by nonfinite Infl via Spec-head agreement. Given this assumption, the 
distribution of PRO is straightforwardly derived: PRO is restricted to the subject position of 
infinitivals, as it cannot check off its Case-feature in other positions, ruled out by Case 
mismatch. It is crucial to note here that in the framework of Chomsky 1995, Case is no longer 
assigned to NPs at SS under government; rather, Chomsky proposes a checking theory of 
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Case assignment, defined in terms of a feature checking relation between two elements. It is 
assumed that lexical items enter the derivation with their Case-feature and other formal (i.e. 
morphological) features already specified, and these features must be checked off against the 
corresponding features of a local head. When a formal feature is strong (such as the Case 
feature of nominals), it must be eliminated in the overt syntax before PF; when a feature is 
weak, it must be deleted at LF. If such morphological features are not eliminated either at PF 
or at LF, they cause the derivation to crash. That is exactly what happens when PRO appears 
in positions other than the subject position of a nonfinite clause: in that case, no proper 
matching relation occurs, therefore PRO cannot check its Case-feature, which results in a 
crash. 
      If PRO is assumed to bear null Case, all the problems mentioned above can be resolved: 
as a Case-marked element, PRO is no longer different from other arguments with respect to 
the Visibility Condition; moreover, since a checking theory of Case does not invoke the 
concept of government, it is no longer necessary to make a distinction between finite and 
nonfinite Infl in terms of their ability to govern. Additionally, a Case-theoretic view correctly 
predicts that PRO is allowed to move from non-Case positions, but not permitted to move 
from a Case position. By conciliating PRO with Case Theory, it seems that the result we get is 
a theory that is both conceptually and empirically more adequate than the previous GB 
approach to the distribution of PRO. The sentences in (5a-b) below, however, raise the 
following problem: as the nonfinite Tense (T) head in infinitival clauses is assumed to be able 
to check null Case, in principle PRO is allowed to occur in ECM and raising structures like 
(5a-b), an unwanted result. How can we exclude PRO from these constructions? In the next 
section, I look at this problem more closely. 
(5) a. *Mary believes [PRO to be happy].  
b. *John seems [PRO to be sick].  
1. 3. Martin’s Proposal 
To account for (5a-b) above, Martin (2001) claims that PRO is excluded from infinitval 
clauses embedded under ECM and raising predicates simply because the nonfinite T head in 
these constructions cannot check null Case on PRO, unlike the T head in control infinitivals. 
Martin argues that this distinction is based on the temporal features of control and raising 
infinitivals: the event time of infinitivals selected by control predicates is interpreted as future 
in relation to the event time of the matrix clause, whereas the event time of infinitivals 
embedded under raising predicates is the same as that of the matrix clause. Therefore 
nonfinite T in control structures bears the feature [+tense] which enables T to check null Case 
(similarly to finite T, which is also specified as [+tense] and checks nominative Case), while 
T in raising and ECM structures is specified as [-tense], hence cannot check Case. Further, 
nonfinite tense in control structures is a modal element, and "it corresponds most closely to 
would or, in certain contexts, should" (cf. Martin 2001: 147).  
      Martin argues that VP-ellipsis provides syntactic evidence for the difference between 
raising/ECM and control infinitivals, as illustrated by (6a-b) (cf. Martin 2001): 
(6) a. Kim isn’t sure she can [VP solve the problem], but she will try [PRO [T to] [VP e]]. 
      b. *Bill believes Sarah to [VP be honest], and he believes [Kim [T to] [VP e]] as well. 
Martin claims that if we adopt an assumption under which only the complement of agreeing 
functional heads can be deleted under ellipsis, the grammaticality of the control structure in 
(6a) follows from the fact that the nonfinite T head agrees with PRO in its Spec position (i.e. 
checks null Case on PRO), hence the VP complement can be deleted. In the ECM structure in 
(6b), however, no agreement takes place between nonfinite T and the NP Kim in its Spec 
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position (i.e. T does not enter a Case-checking relation with the NP), yet the VP complement 
is deleted – accordingly, (6b) is ungrammatical. The empirical facts in (6a-b) are what we 
expect under Martin’s assumption that T enters an agreement relation with its specifier only in 
control infinitivals (and consequently, T checks Case only in control structures). 
      In addition to the problem raised by (5a-b), a further issue in connection with the Case-
checking properties of nonfinite T is posed by want-infinitivals: the predicate want can take 
an infinitival complement with either PRO or a lexical NP in subject position, and want can 
also take a for-infinitival complement. How can we account for these facts under the null 
Case theory? Martin argues that in all three cases, nonfinite T checks null Case on the 
embedded subject, as in (7a-c) below (cf. Martin 2001): 
(7) a. John wants [PRO to win]. 
      b. John wants [his team to win]. 
      c. John wants [for his team to win]. 
For such an analysis to be viable, it is crucial for Martin to assume the following: (i) neither T 
in control infinitivals nor PRO bears φ-features (grammatical features like gender, number, 
etc.); (ii) φ-features on NPs are uninterpretable (a feature that is not legible at the interfaces 
and causes the derivation to crash at LF unless deleted prior to LF), therefore need to be 
checked; (iii) the complementizer for is associated with formal φ-features, but it cannot check 
Case on the NP following it. With these stipulations in mind, (7b-c) are accounted for as 
follows: in (7b), nonfinite T checks null Case on the lexical NP his team, but it cannot check 
the φ-features of the NP, therefore a null for precedes the NP to check the φ-features of the 
NP. In (7c), his team checks null Case in the embedded subject position overtly, then raises 
covertly at LF to the Spec position of for to check its φ-features. The ungrammaticality of (8a-
b) below is also deduced from provisos (i), (ii) and (iii). In (8a), a lexical NP such as John 
cannot appear in the [Spec, TP] position of a control infinitival, as its φ-features remain 
unchecked in that position; similarly, in (8b) PRO is not allowed to co-occur with for, as it 
cannot check the complementizer’s uninterpretable φ-features. 
(8) a. *Mary tried John to open the door. 
b. *Mary wants for PRO to win. 
      On closer inspection, however, Martin’s analysis may prove to be problematic from both a 
conceptual and an empirical point of view. First, as argued by Baltin and Barrett (2002), it is 
theoretically suspect to assume a link between the presence of a PRO subject in an infinitival 
and the interpretive properties of that infinitival. Nevertheless, this is exactly what is 
suggested by Martin’s proposal, which relates the modal interpretation of control infinitivals 
to the licensing of a PRO subject in these infinitivals. In other words, it is not reasonable to 
distinguish sentences associated with different semantic interpretations by a feature (in our 
case the [+tense] feature on T) that also has an effect on the structure of those sentences. 
Accordingly, although the time of the gerundial is interpreted as future in relation to the 
matrix predicate in (9a), while interpreted as identical with the event time of the matrix verb 
in (9b), it seems quite dubious to postulate the existence of a feature that would serve to 
distinguish the two interpretations syntactically as well (cf. Baltin and Barrett 2002): 
(9) a. He avoided bringing the wine. 
b. He continued bringing the wine. 
      Furthermore, as noted by Baltin and Barrett, there are control infinitivals with a PRO 
subject that do not display the semantic property attributed to them by Martin, as shown in 
(10a) where the infinitival is the complement of a psychological adjective, or in (10b) where it 
is the complement of a degree word. In both sentences, the event time of the embedded 
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nonfinite clause is interpreted as simultaneous with that of the matrix clause, a temporal 
relation between the two clauses that is supposed by Martin to be characteristic only of raising 
and ECM structures (cf. Baltin and Barrett 2002): 
(10) a. Kerry was glad to see her best friend walk out the door. 
  b. John was too obtuse to be aware of his effect on others. 
      Likewise, in the case of VP-ellipsis, if we expand the empirical coverage to include 
raising constructions, it seems again that Martin’s analysis makes the wrong empirical 
predictions. Interestingly, as Baltin and Barrett show, there are raising predicates that license 
ellipsis of their complement, as in (11a-b), contrary to what we expect under Martin’s 
assumptions (cf. Baltin and Barrett 2002): 
(11) a. Bob tries not to gain weight but he tends to_.  
        b. Although she hasn’t spoken to the president yet, she is supposed to_. 
      Martin’s analysis of want-infinitivals also raises certain nontrivial issues that need to be 
addressed. Let us begin by examining the status of provisos (i), (ii) and (iii) which are 
essential for Martin’s account of these constructions to be tenable. Proviso (i) requires that 
both PRO and nonfinite T in control infinitivals lack φ-features entirely. Under the 
assumption that PRO does not bear φ-features, however, the agreement facts in (12) are left 
unexplained (cf. Chomsky 1995): 
(12) a. I want [them to be officers]. 
       b. *They want [me to be officers]. 
       c. They want [PRO to be officers]. 
In (12a) and (12c), there is agreement in the embedded clause between the subject and the 
predicate, while the ungrammaticality of (12b) follows from the lack of φ-agreement between 
the embedded subject and officers. Chomsky (1995) illustrates with examples such as (12) 
that PRO must indeed bear φ-features for agreement, just like any other NP. Further, if the 
stipulation that PRO is Case-marked is to be retained, nonfinite T in control infinitivals also 
has to be assumed to carry a full set of uninterpretable φ-features. This follows from the fact 
that in the framework of Chomsky 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Case checking is a reflex of φ-feature 
agreement between a Case-assigning functional head and a nominal with an unvalued Case-
feature that is valued and deleted through this agreement relation. Consequently, there must 
be a Case-assigning head with a complete φ-set in control infinitivals that values the 
uninterpretable Case-feature of PRO as a result of φ-agreement between PRO and this head, 
for which the only candidate is nonfinite T. The stipulations of proviso (i) therefore cannot be 
adopted. 
      Proviso (ii) requires that φ-features of NPs be checked in the course of the derivation, i.e. 
that φ-features on NPs be uninterpretable. In Chomsky’s (2000) Agree-based system of 
feature checking, formal features of lexical items are either LF-interpretable, that is, they 
contribute to semantic interpretation at LF, or LF-uninterpretable, including features that have 
no semantic value at LF. Interpretable features are therefore legible at LF, in contrast to 
uninterpretable features that must be checked (i.e. valued and deleted under the operation 
Agree which is established by matching of uninterpretable features of probe α and 
interpretable features of goal β) prior to LF for the derivation to converge. Interpretability or 
uninterpretability of a feature is not stipulated, however: while uninterpretable features on a 
lexical item need explanation and justification, interpretability of a feature is attested by the 
fact that it is involved in the semantic interpretation of a linguistic expression. Accordingly, 
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Chomsky takes φ-features on nominals to be interpretable, and it is the φ-features of 
functional heads such as T and v that are uninterpretable (i.e. unvalued) and need to be valued 
in an agreement relation. Hence it is not reasonable to adopt proviso (ii). 
      Proviso (iii) defines the complementizer for as an element that bears uninterpretable φ-
features and by virtue of this property, it enters an agreement relation with the φ-set of the 
subject NP in a for-to infinitival construction. Crucially, Martin assumes that the Case of the 
NP is not checked by for as a result of this φ-agreement relation; rather, it is nonfinite T that is 
supposed to check Case on the NP, assigning null Case to the nominal. Such an analysis, 
however, seems to be both conceptually and empirically inadequate. First, as we have seen 
above, Case checking is supposed to be assigned under φ-agreement between two elements, 
hence nonfinite T in principle cannot delete Case in a nominal if they do not φ-agree. Second, 
null Case cannot be allowed to be checked by lexical NPs: such an assumption fails 
empirically, as we will see below. Third, Martin’s analysis cannot explain the strong 
dependency relationship apparent between for and the subject NP in for-to infinitivals, which 
seems to be related to Case-theoretic reasons. For illustration, consider (13a-f): 
(13) a. For John to arrive on time would be preferable. 
       b. *John to arrive on time would be preferable.  
       c. It would be preferable for John to arrive on time. 
       d. *It would be preferable John to arrive on time.         
       e. *Mary prefers for usually John to arrive on time. 
       f. Mary prefers for him/*he to arrive on time. 
Under the revision of (ii) above, the ungrammatical sentences can no longer be explained by 
alluding to the uninterpretability of the NP’s φ-features. What appears to be crucial in these 
sentences is indeed the role of for, or rather its absence, as shown by (13b) and (13d), where 
the ungrammaticality must be due to the lack of for. (13e-f) also imply that the licensing of 
lexical subjects in for-to constructions relies crucially on the complementizer: in (13e), a 
sentence adverb is not allowed to intervene between for and the nominal, while in (13f) the 
close relation between for and the NP is attested by the obligatory overt Accusative Case 
marking of the pronominal subject. Given these empirical data, Hazout (2004) argues that in 
for-to infinitivals, the subject is licensed through a Case-checking relation by the 
complementizer for – in fact, there is no other candidate to check structural Case on the 
subject NP, as Case checking in a φ-agreement relationship is not possible between nonfinite 
T and a lexical NP, as shown by (13b) and (13d).  
      If, however, for is supposed to be responsible for the Case-licensing of the subject in for-
to constructions, how do we account for the optionality of for in infinitivals selected by want-
type predicates?  
(14) a. I want (for) John to be successful. 
       b. We would prefer (for) him to stay at home. 
One option is to assume that a null for is present to check Case on the NP in the constructions 
without an overt complementizer – in this case, however, it has to be explained why a null for 
is not possible in sentences such as (13d). Another option to account for (14a-b), as suggested 
by Radford (2000), is to suppose that the infinitival selected by a want-type predicate is a TP 
rather than a CP complement when the overt for is missing, and the Case of the subject NP is 
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checked by the matrix verb similarly to ECM structures.130 An analysis along these lines 
seems to be motivated by empirical data in (15a-b): in (15a), a sentence adverb cannot 
intervene between want and him, whereas in (15b) the infinitival complement of want cannot 
occur in the focus position of a pseudo-cleft sentence. This seems to indicate that the 
ungrammaticality of both (15a-b) must follow from the inability of the matrix predicate want 
to check Case on the infinitival subject (cf. Radford 2000). 
(15) a. *They wanted desperately him to win the race. 
       b. *What John wants is Mary to win the race. 
      If we adopt the idea that in for-to infinitivals it is the C head for that checks Case on the 
subject NP, some further questions arise with respect to this Case-checking relation. One such 
question is related to the fact that the subject is assigned Case by C in [Spec, TP] position, not 
in a Spec-head agreement relationship with C (the canonical Case checking configuration on 
earlier assumptions). However, Case-valuing under such a long-distance agreement (LDA) 
relation is possible between two elements in Chomsky 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2005a. In an LDA 
relation between the C head for and an NP, the operation Agree values and deletes the 
uninterpretable φ-features of C under matching with the interpretable φ-features of the 
nominal, and one effect of the operation is the structural Case marking of the subject NP in 
situ by C.  
      A further issue is posed by the proposal (Chomsky 2000, 2001a) that C selects Tcomp, i.e. a 
T head with a full set of agreement features and the ability to assign Case - null Case if T is 
nonfinite, and Nominative Case if finite. As formulated in Chomsky 2001b, 2005a, 2005b, the 
true locus of Tense- and agreement features is indeed C, and T only inherits these features 
derivatively from C, hence only if it is selected by C. The problem that arises is the following: 
Tcomp in nonfinite structures is incompatible with a lexical NP in its Spec position (which is 
presumably due to Case mismatch between nonfinite T and the overt NP), as shown by the 
impossibility of an overt subject in control infinitivals. As a for-to infinitival is a CP 
complement that is assumed to select Tcomp, and we find a lexical subject in [Spec, TP] 
position, a question may arise regarding the properties of nonfinite T in these structures. 
There are two possible alternatives to overcome this conundrum. Alternative I is to suppose 
that as in for-to constructions it is the function of C to assign Case to the subject, T inherits 
only the φ-features of C, but is Tenseless, hence cannot assign Case and therefore no Case 
mismatch occurs. On this view, there are two ways to proceed:  
(i) The φ-agreement relation between C and the NP is direct: the nominal first values the 
φ-features of nonfinite T and then also deletes the agreement features on C, as a result 
of which its Case feature is valued.  
(ii) The φ-agreement relation between C and the NP is indirect: the NP values only the 
uninterpretable φ-set of T, and then T φ-agrees with C (this may be possible given 
Chomsky’s (2001a) assumption that the uninterpretable φ-set of C is valued by T 
under the operation Agree). Under a principle of transitivity applied to φ-agreement 
relations (proposed in Frampton, Gutmann, Legate and Yang 2000), this has the effect 
of C-NP φ-agreement and structural Case checking on the NP by C.  
Alternative II to get over the problem posed by the nature of nonfinite T in for-to infinitivals 
is to assume that the complementizer for selects for a TP with a defective head Tdef, associated 
with ECM and raising structures. Tdef is φ-incomplete as it bears only the (unvalued) feature 
[person] and hence is unable to delete the Case feature of an NP (as desired). In this case, the 
 
130 However, see Lasnik and Saito (1991) for arguments against an analysis where the embedded subject in 
structures of the form want someone to do something raises to [Spec, VP] position (or to [Spec, AgrOP] on 
earlier assumptions) to check Accusative Case, as is supposed in the case of ECM structures. 
 171 
uninterpretable agreement features of C are deleted under Agree by the interpretable φ-set of 
the subject NP (the effect of which is Case-marking of the NP by C), the only possible 
candidate to enter such an agreement relation with C.131 
      In view of the considerations above, let us now reexamine Martin’s analysis of want-
infinitival constructions. In (7a), null Case on PRO is checked as a result of φ-feature 
agreement between PRO and nonfinite T. In (7b), the Accusative Case on the NP is licensed 
by the matrix predicate want; additionally, there is no need to postulate the presence of a null 
for in the structure, as φ-features on NPs are interpretable, hence need not be checked. In (7c), 
the NP is assigned Accusative Case by for, and as the φ-set of the NP is interpretable, we do 
not have to stipulate covert raising of the subject at LF.132 Further, the ungrammaticality of 
(8a) can no longer be explained under the assumption that the φ-set of the NP remains 
unchecked; indeed, if φ-features on NPs are interpretable (as assumed above), structures like 
(8a) are predicted to be acceptable under Martin’s analysis, given that it allows lexical NPs to 
be assigned null Case by nonfinite T. In effect, contrary to what Martin supposes, it seems 
reasonable to attribute the unacceptability of (8a) to Case mismatch: null Case cannot be 
checked on a lexical NP. In a similar vein, as PRO is assumed to bear φ-features, (8b) can no 
longer be accounted for by alluding to the feature checking requirement of for, since the 
uninterpretable φ-set of the complementizer can in principle be deleted by the φ-set of PRO. 
In fact, if the postulation that PRO carries φ-features is adopted, (8b) is again predicted to be 
grammatical under Martin’s analysis, since it allows null Case to be checked in for-to 
infinitivals. That possibility, however, needs to be excluded if we wish to account for (8b); in 
contrast to Martin’s account, the ungrammaticality of the sentence is again due to Case-
theoretic reasons: Accusative Case cannot be checked on PRO. 
      From the discussion so far, it seems that Martin’s proposal is both theoretically and 
empirically inadequate. On the one hand, it leaves us without any principled explanation of 
some structures, given the counterexamples to the generalization related to the temporal 
properties of infinitivals. On the other hand, this temporal distinction does not appear to be 
motivated on strong conceptual grounds. On the face of it, this seems to be problematic not 
only for a null Case account of the distribution of PRO, but consequently also for a theory 
which maintains that a grammatical formative like PRO exists. In view of these 
considerations, we are faced with two options: either we attempt to save the null Case theory 
(along with PRO), in which case at least a different technical implementation of the theory is 
necessary for it to be tenable at all; or we may search for another alternative account of the 
syntax of control infinitivals that does not resort to the null Case theory and PRO. In effect, 
such a theory has been proposed recently within current minimalist approaches to grammar, 
and it is now in order to examine whether that theory proves to be preferable to previous 
accounts.  
 
Chapter 2: A Movement Theory of Control (MTC) 
In this chapter, I discuss Hornstein’s movement analysis of control structures. In section 2. 1., 
I describe Hornstein’s MTC, in section 2. 2., the problems raised by the theory are 
investigated and in section 2. 3., some concluding remarks are provided. 
 
131 For an alternative analysis of for-to infinitivals, see Pesetsky and Torrego (2001). 
132 That such an LF raising does not take place is in fact motivated on other grounds as well, as in the Agree-
based system of Chomsky (2000, 2001a) there is no overt/covert distinction, and covert movement is 
reinterpreted in terms of overt agreement. Additionally, given LDA, a Spec-head configuration is not a 
prerequisite for feature checking and agreement, hence the NP would not have to raise to enter an Agree relation 
with for. 
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2. 1. Hornstein’s MTC 
The methodological concerns stressed within MP have motivated a minimalist effort to 
reexamine grammatical concepts and processes underlying standard GB accounts. In 
particular, issues related to optimal grammatical design have cast doubt on the status of theory 
internal constructs such as the non-interface levels DS and SS. Grammar internal formatives 
are considered problematic from a conceptual point of view within MP, and therefore such 
constructs should only be adopted if their postulation rests on strong empirical grounds. 
      Given this theoretical backdrop, Hornstein (henceforth H) (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003) 
and Boeckx and Hornstein (2003, 2004) argue for a reductionist view of the syntax of control 
infinitivals, which dispenses with the whole PRO module. Specifically, H argues that PRO is 
a grammar internal formative with highly idiosyncratic properties, and its postulation gives 
rise to various theoretical complications in the grammar: on the one hand, positing a PRO 
subject introduces a whole additional module into the grammar, the Control module, which 
serves to account for the interpretive properties of PRO in control structures. On the other 
hand, explaining the distribution of PRO requires undesirable theoretical adjustments in that 
we have to postulate a special null Case, which H claims to be both conceptually and 
empirically problematic: in effect, null Case is devised to fit only PRO. This follows from the 
assumption that the only nominal element that can be assigned null Case is PRO, and only the 
nonfinite T of control infinitivals can license this Case; further, PRO is the only nominal that 
is specified to bear but a single Case. Consequently, H maintains that the null Case theory is 
highly stipulative, and it nearly amounts to restating the observation that PRO occupies the 
[Spec, TP] position of control infinitives. 
      These considerations lead H to reexamine the distinction traditionally assumed to obtain 
between raising and control structures within the GB framework. Thus in the raising structure 
in (16a) John is supposed to have raised from the embedded to the matrix subject position, 
leaving a trace in its original site which is co-indexed with the moved expression. In (16b) the 
matrix subject position is assumed to be filled by lexical insertion, and the embedded subject 
position is occupied by a base-generated null argument PRO, which is controlled by John (cf. 
Hornstein 2003): 
(16) a. Johni seems [ti to like Mary].  
       b. Johni tried [PROi to like Mary]. 
In (16a), John is associated with a single θ-role, assigned to it by the embedded verb like, 
whereas in (16b) John is understood to be both the trier and the liker. This follows from the 
different thematic properties of the predicates: in contrast to the verb try, the verb seem does 
not assign a θ-role to the external argument position, as shown by its ability to host expletives 
in that site. The alleged structural difference between raising and control structures is 
traceable to the postulation of DS and the θ-Criterion within GB: DS requires that all thematic 
positions be filled by lexical insertion prior to movement operations, while the θ-Criterion 
stipulates that a chain contains at most one θ-position. Accordingly, adopting these two 
assumptions amounts to precluding movement between θ-positions and disallowing NPs to 
bear more than one θ-role. Given DS and the θ-Criterion, the structural distinction between 
(16a) and (16b) follows: in (16a) John is allowed to move from its DS θ-position to the matrix 
subject position (for Case-theoretic reasons), as seem does not assign a θ-role to John. In 
(16b), such movement would be illicit, as both the matrix and the embedded subject positions 
are θ-positions; consequently, a null PRO subject has to be assumed to occupy the embedded 
subject position. 
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      Within MP, DS is dispensed with, since it is viewed as a non-interface theory internal 
level the postulation of which is not necessary from a conceptual point of view. H argues that 
adopting the θ-Criterion also raises methodological issues within the current minimalist 
approach to grammar. Once DS and the θ-Criterion are eliminated, the constraints that they 
imposed on grammar can also be abandoned. Accordingly, H claims that it would be 
reasonable to reconsider the traditional GB control/raising distinction and the status of PRO. 
Specifically, H proposes a movement-based theory of control, suggesting that in control 
structures like (16b) above, PRO is the residue of overt A-movement, hence it is identical to 
an NP-trace.133 On such an account, the structure of (16b) is as follows: 
(17) Johni tried [ti to like Mary].  
In (17) above, John has moved from the embedded to the matrix subject position, just like in a 
raising construction. Under this view, the operations underlying raising and control structures 
are the same (as both raising and control instantiate NP-movement, which is triggered by 
Case-theoretic needs), with the single distinction that in raising, movement of the NP is from 
a θ-position to a non-θ-position, whereas in control expressions move between θ-positions. 
The proposal entails that the subject position of control infinitivals is not a Case-marking 
position, hence A-movement from this position is licit. For such an analysis to be viable, H is 
forced to adopt the following assumptions:  
(18) a. θ-roles are features on verbs/predicates, thus they are able to license movement, and an 
NP receives a θ-role by checking the thematic feature of the given predicate 
        b. there is no upper limit on the number of θ-features that an NP/A-chain can bear 
        c. movement is greedy, and Greed is interpreted as "enlightened self-interest" (ESI) 
Positing (18a-b) is necessary for movement to be allowed between θ-positions; (18c) requires 
all movement to take place for reasons of feature checking (that is, be greedy), while ESI 
ensures that the checking needs of the target suffice to license movement.134  
      Given the assumptions in (18a-c), the derivation of a subject-control sentence under a 
movement approach is as follows (cf. Hornstein 1999):135 
(19) a. John hopes to leave. 
       b. [IP John [VP John [hopes [IP John to [VP John leave]]]]] 
In the derivation of (19a), John first merges with the embedded VP, thereby checking the 
external θ-role of leave. John then moves to the embedded [Spec, IP] position to check the 
EPP feature of to; the Case of John is not checked here, as no Case is assigned to the 
embedded subject position under H’s theory. John then raises to the matrix [Spec, VP] 
position (which is again a θ-position), checking the θ-feature of the matrix predicate hope, 
thereby assuming a second θ-role – thus John bears both the leaver and the hoper θ-role. 
Finally, John moves to the matrix [Spec, IP] position, where it checks the EPP feature of I and 
its own Case feature, and the derivation converges with all relevant features checked.  
 
133 For a movement analysis of control structures, see also O’Neil (1997) and Manzini and Roussou (2000). For 
convincing arguments against such an analysis, see Culicover and Jackendoff (2001), Landau (2003) and Brody 
(1999, 2001). 
 
134 Under the early minimalist concept of Greed – in contrast to ESI - only the morphological requirements of the 
moved item are relevant. In Chomsky 2000, 2001a both the target (i.e. the probe) and the moved element (i.e. the 
goal) must be active for movement to take place. 
135 Given the copy theory of movement within MP, which takes traces to be copies of the moved element that are 
deleted in the phonological component, traces of A-movement are indicated by copies of John in (19b). 
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      H argues that the assumptions in (18a-c) and the MTC allow for a significant reduction 
and simplification of the theory of grammar, since there is no need to postulate a special 
control module which accounts for the interpretive properties of PRO in control 
configurations; rather, the general characteristics of obligatory control (OC) and 
nonobligatory control (NOC) structures follow directly from the MTC. In other words, under 
the MTC we can explain the basic properties of OC and NOC structures. Consider the 
ungrammatical OC structures in (20) below (cf. Hornstein 1999):  
(20) a. * It was expected PRO to shave himself. 
        b. * John thinks that it was expected PRO to shave himself. 
        c. * John’s campaign expects PRO to shave himself. 
        d. * Johni told Maryj PROi+j to wash each other.  
(20a) shows that PRO must have an antecedent in an OC configuration, otherwise the 
sentence is not acceptable. (20b) indicates that the antecedent of PRO must be local in OC 
structures, whereas (20c) illustrates that this antecedent must c-command PRO: the 
ungrammaticality of the sentences follows from the fact that these requirements are not 
satisfied. (20d) shows that PRO is not allowed to have split antecedents in an OC structure. 
These properties of OC structures are derived under the MTC as follows: given that PRO is a 
trace of A-movement, it needs to have an antecedent, which has to c-command its trace and 
also be local to it, as is standardly supposed in the case of A-chains. The ungrammaticality of 
(20d) also follows under the MTC given the assumption that two NPs could not have moved 
from the same position, as would be required in (20d). 
      Still, there are grammatical NOC configurations where PRO need not have a local, c-
commanding antecedent, and where split antecedents are allowed – surely, given the analysis 
of (20a-d) these cases cannot fall under the MTC. For this reason, H proposes that A-
movement takes place only in OC structures, and what we have in the embedded subject 
position in NOC structures is the null pronominal pro, as in (21) below (cf. Hornstein 1999): 
(21) It is believed that pro shaving is important. 
H argues that such an assumption is confirmed by the interpretive properties of NOC 
constructions, since these structures can be paraphrased by replacing PRO (or pro, under H’s 
view) with overt pronouns (as is expected if the null pronominal pro occupies the relevant 
position in NOC structures). PRO’s distribution is also identical to that of a pronoun in NOC 
configurations in that it does not have to obey the locality conditions characteristic of A-traces 
and anaphors.  
      The question may arise as to why movement does not take place in these NOC structures. 
The reasoning is as follows: NOC PRO occurs within islands out of which movement is 
prohibited, hence movement from the embedded [Spec, IP] position is not an option in these 
structures. From this it follows that OC PRO and NOC PRO are in complementary 
distribution: when NOC PRO is permitted, OC PRO (i.e. movement) is barred. But does the 
reverse hold? In other words, how can we exclude NOC PRO from positions occupied by OC 
PRO? H argues that the problem may be solved in terms of an economy restriction: he 
assumes that movement (OC) is more economical than construal processes (NOC), hence 
preferred by UG. This means that if the derivation can converge through the application of 
movement operations (as in the case of OC), the more costly non-movement derivation where 
construal rules are employed (NOC) will be excluded by economy. This implies that the 
application of construal rules is a costly last resort operation, and therefore when movement is 
allowed to occur in a control structure, it must occur (the OC cases); only when movement is 
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barred do we expect to find an NOC configuration. Further, H treats the licensing of pro 
similarly to the phenomenon of do-support: he supposes that pro is a grammatical formative 
that is never present in the numeration (i.e. a set of lexical items selected from the lexicon that 
feed the derivation of a syntactic object), it is only added to the computation during the course 
of the derivation as a last resort option, thereby allowing a derivation to converge. In other 
words, the use of pro is costly, and is only permitted when convergence is not possible 
without pro. Additionally, pro is assumed to lack Case, but it is supposed to be able to check 
the relevant features of nonfinite Infl.  
      Let us finally review the empirical arguments put forth by H in support of the assumption 
that PRO is identical to an NP-trace and against a theory of null Case. The first argument is 
related to the phenomenon of wanna-contraction. Consider (22a-c) below (cf. Hornstein 
1999): 
(22) a. Whoi do you want [ti to vanish]? / * Who do you wanna vanish? 
       b. I want [PRO to leave]. / I wanna leave. 
       c. Johni’s going [ti to leave]. / John’s gonna leave. 
In (22a), contraction of to onto want is blocked by the Accusative Case-marked wh-trace; in 
(22b), null Case-marked PRO fails to block contraction, just like the NP-trace in (22c). H 
argues that as PRO is supposed to bear null Case, it should behave similarly to a Case-marked 
wh-trace in blocking contraction, but it behaves like a non-Case marked NP-trace in 
contraction contexts, as shown by (22). If PRO is assimilated to an NP-trace, we can account 
for why both PRO and NP-trace allow contraction in (22), unlike the Case-marked wh-trace. 
      The second argument is directed particularly against a theory of null Case. H claims that a 
null Case theory is highly implausible given the sentence in (23), which H assumes to be a 
case of control, involving a PRO subject when the thematic object is not overtly realized. The 
problem is that in (23), PRO does not appear in [Spec, TP] position, hence cannot be assigned 
null Case by a nonfinite T head.  
(23) Maryi washed PROi. 
(23) is explained under the MTC as follows: as (23) is a case of OC, Mary is supposed to 
move from the object position of wash to the matrix subject position, thereby receiving both 
the internal and the external θ-role of the verb. This implies that reflexive verbs like wash can 
optionally suppress their Accusative Case in structures such as (23), given that two Cases 
(Accusative in the object postion and Nominative in the subject position of wash) cannot be 
licensed on Mary.  
      H claims that the MTC is superior to the standard account of the syntax of control 
infinitivals on both conceptual and empirical grounds. The theory, however, though not 
without merit, is also not without problems, as we will see in the next section. 
2. 2. Some Problems for Hornstein’s Theory  
Let us first reexamine the two empirical arguments that seem to justify H’s theory: wanna-
contraction and PRO in positions other than [Spec, TP]. 
2. 2. 1. Wanna-contraction  
Contraction is a phonological operation whereby finite auxiliaries or the infinitival particle to 
(i.e. a finite or infinitival T head) contracts onto a preceding matrix verb. H adopts the 
standard Case-marked trace analysis of contraction phenomena, which stipulates that non-
phonetic Case-marked traces block contraction, while null arguments like PRO and non-
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phonetic Caseless traces do not block contraction. Under this account, the contrast between 
sentences like (24a) and (24b) below is analysed as follows: the wh-trace in (24a) is Case-
marked, hence blocks T-contraction, whereas the NP-trace in (24b) is Caseless, thus allowing 
the contraction of the infinitival T head onto the matrix V (cf. Bošković 1997). 
(24) a. Whoi do you want ti to buy a car? / * Who do you wanna buy a car? 
       b. Johni is supposed ti to leave on Monday. / John is sposta leave on Monday. 
       c. I want PRO to buy a car. / I wanna PRO buy a car. 
The above Case-marked trace analysis, as we have seen, raises the following problem with 
regard to (24c) if we assume a theory of null Case: PRO is marked for Case, unlike an NP-
trace and like a wh-trace, but it does not block contraction, unlike Case-marked wh-traces and 
like Caseless NP-traces. H argues that this casts a doubt on a null Case approach. 
      Bošković (1997) and Radford (2000) argue, however, that the standard Case-marked trace 
analysis of contraction facts is problematic from both a conceptual and an empirical point of 
view. First, there is empirical data that may cast doubt on such an analysis (cf. Radford 2000, 
Bošković 1997): 
(25) a. Whoi do you think ti is telling the truth? / Who do you think’s telling the truth? 
       b. Whati do you think ti is happening there tomorrow? / What do you think’s happening 
there tomorrow?  
Although a Case-marked wh-trace apparently intervenes between the finite auxiliary and the 
matrix verb in both sentences, T-contraction is not blocked in either of the examples in (25). 
Under the standard analysis of contraction phenomena which H adopts, both sentences are 
predicted to be ungrammatical (contrary to fact), given that Case-marked traces are assumed 
to block contraction on that analysis.  
      The standard view of contraction also raises conceptual issues: in contrast to the Case-
marked trace analysis, the null hypothesis would be to assume that given their uniform 
phonetic status, all empty categories (ECs) (wh-traces, NP-traces, PRO) behave similarly in 
contraction contexts, that is, we should expect all ECs to allow (or block) contraction. 
Theoretically, an optimal minimalist account of T-contraction seems to be to suppose that 
only overt categories block contraction. 
      These considerations cast doubt on the standard Case-marked trace analysis of contraction 
phenomena, which serves as the basis of H’s empirical argument for reducing PRO to an NP-
trace. The question then arises: how the contraction facts in (24) and (25) can be explained, if 
not under the standard Case-marked trace analysis? Radford (2000) claims that the 
phenomenon of T-contraction can be adequately accounted for under the phase-based theory 
of grammar developed in Chomsky 2000, 2001a, 2001b. Before proceeding with the details, 
however, it is necessary to outline the core set of assumptions that underlie the phase-based 
analysis of T-contraction.  
      In recent work, Chomsky argues that derivations are strictly cyclic, that is, the syntactic 
computation proceeds via derivational phases, which Chomsky takes to be CP and transitive 
vP. Phases are supposed to play a special role in the narrow syntactic computation by 
constraining all operations in terms of the Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC), defined in 
(26) below (cf. Chomsky 2000, 2001a, 2001b): 
(26) Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC) 
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In a phase α with head H, the domain of H is not accessible to operations outside H, only H 
and its edge (its Specs) are accessible to such operations. 
The PIC ensures that once a phase α is completed (i.e. judged convergent), no further 
operations are allowed to access elements inside α below its head H; further, H and its edge 
are accessible to operations outside HP only until the next strong phase (CP or transitive vP) 
is completed. The conditions imposed by the PIC reduce computational complexity both for 
narrow syntax and the phonological component in that earlier phases of the derivation can be 
forgotten by the system. 
      The strong phase-level is also relevant with respect to Spell-Out, an operation that applies 
at some point in the computation to the structure already formed and sends it to the PF 
interface. This means that Spell-Out is cyclic, namely, it applies multiple times in the course 
of the computation: at every (strong) phase level, Spell-Out applies to the complement of the 
phase head and sends it to the interface levels where it is inspected for convergence.136 The 
head of the phase and its specifiers are spelled out only after the next strong phase is 
constructed (i.e. H and its specifiers are spelled out together with the complement of the next 
higher phase head).  
      Additionally, in the current theoretical framework the operation Move is assumed to be 
the combination of the two operations Copy and Merge: when movement occurs, the system 
first makes a copy of the moved lexical item, then the lexical item is merged in the target 
position of movement.137 What interests us here is again the role of Spell-Out: copies of the 
moved item are supposed to be deleted (except from the head of the chain) prior to the 
shipping of the relevant structure to the PF level, hence at the point when Spell-Out applies.138 
      Keeping in mind the above assumptions and the stipulation that contraction is blocked 
only by overt constituents, let us examine how the contraction phenomena in (24) and (25) 
can be explained under a phase-based approach to grammar. Consider sentence (25a), with the 
relevant structure illustrated in (26) below (cf. Radford 2000): 
(26) [vP who you [v ø] [VP [V think] [CP who[C ø] [TP who [T is] telling the truth]]]] 
If we suppose that contraction of the finite auxiliary is onto the matrix V think takes place 
when the matrix VP containing think is spelled out on the vP phase, the grammaticality of the 
sentence follows straightforwardly. The trace of who in [Spec, TP] is deleted when the 
embedded CP phase is constructed and Spell-Out applies to its TP complement, whereas the 
copy in embedded [Spec, CP] position is deleted on the matrix vP phase. Accordingly, at the 
stage of the derivation when the matrix V head think is spelled out, there will be no overt 
constituent intervening between think and is, given that both copies of who have already been 
given a null spellout at this point of the derivation; hence contraction of think and is yields a 
grammatical sentence. The grammaticality of (25b) and (24b-c) can be accounted for in a 
similar fashion; let us rather turn to the ungrammatical case in (24a). On the assumption that 
(24a) is similar to an ECM structure, the complement of want is TP rather than CP.139 The 
structure of the sentence is represented as in (27) below (cf. Radford 2000): 
(27) [CP Who [C do] [TP you [T do] [vP who you [v want+ø] [VP who [V want] [TP who [T to] win 
the race]]]]] 
 
136 The concept of cyclic Spell-Out ensures that the phonological cycle proceeds in parallel with the narrow-
syntactic computation (i.e. there is in fact a single cycle in the grammar). 
137 This is the copy theory of movement already mentioned above. 
138 Alternatively, we may assume that copies are deleted prior to the application of Spell-Out by a copy deletion 
operation called Chain Reduction (CR), which, however, is not part of the narrow syntactic computation (it is 
rather an ’interface’ operation - see Fujii 2005). 
139 See section 1. 3 for arguments that support an ECM analysis of structures of the form want+NP+to-infinitive. 
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As (24a) is an ECM structure, the matrix verb want has to raise from the head V position of 
VP to v, while who - as the object of the verb want - first moves to [Spec, VP], then raises 
further to [Spec, vP] position, which is an escape hatch for successive cyclic wh-movement. 
Finally, it raises to the matrix [Spec, CP] position. When the VP complement of the vP phase 
is spelled out, all traces are deleted within VP; however, the verb want is spelled out only on 
the matrix CP phase, at a point in the derivation when operations are no longer allowed to 
access items that belong to the matrix VP, given the PIC (which prohibits operations that 
cross phase boundaries). Accordingly, contraction of to onto want is blocked in (24a). 
      To sum up, it may be concluded that H’s empirical argument which assimilates PRO to an 
NP-trace on the basis of contraction facts is not valid. This follows from the fact that the 
Case-marked trace account of contraction phenomena upon which H builds his argument is 
both conceptually and empirically problematic, as we have seen. Conversely, if we adopt a 
phase-based view of grammar and the assumption that only overt constituents block 
contraction, we can adequately account for contraction facts. 
2. 2. 2. Control with Reflexive Verbs 
H assumes that sentences involving reflexive predicates such as (23) above are formed by A-
movement, whereby the moved NP receives both the internal θ-role (in the object position of 
the verb) and the external argument role (in subject position). Under this view, the structure of 
(23) is represented as follows (cf. Hornstein 1999): 
(28) [IP Mary [ past [VP Mary [ wash Mary]]]]  
According to H, (23) does not violate Case theory, as the NP Mary does not receive 
Accusative Case in the object position, given that the ability of wash to assign Case to its 
complement is optional; hence in (23) wash lacks a Case feature, and Case is checked on 
Mary only in the external argument position. 
      This analysis may pose a question as to how sentences such as (29a-b) below are formed.  
(29) a. Mary washed herself. 
       b. John saw himself. 
H argues that reflexives like himself in (29a-b) are the residues of movement, just like PRO. 
In other words, both PRO and reflexives are NP-traces, distinguished only by Case 
requirements: reflexives are formed when Case is obligatorily checked (just like in (29a-b) 
above). H has two reasons for such an analysis: (i) he wishes to eliminate Principle A of the 
Binding Theory, hence aims to reduce the distribution of anaphors to movement processes; 
(ii) once control is analysed as movement, local anaphors should also be reanalysed in these 
terms, given the empirical parallels between the two phenomena.  
      For illustration, consider how a reflexive like himself in (29b) is formed on H’s 
assumptions: the computational system adds self to the derivation, which merges with John in 
the object position of the verb and is assigned Accusative Case. John then raises, and after its 
copy in the object position of saw is deleted, the pronoun him is added by the system to 
support the bound morpheme self.  
      Such a movement analysis of reflexives, however, raises both conceptual and empirical 
problems. First, H’s analysis is incompatible with the Inclusiveness Condition (a principle 
which disallows the introduction of new features and objects in the course of the 
computation), as he assumes that neither the reflexive morpheme self nor the pronoun him are 
part of the lexical array that is selected to feed the derivation.  
      Second, H’s account of reflexives requires that movement be allowed from a position that 
is Case-marked, violating the well-known generalization that arguments are not permitted to 
move from Case-marked positions. For illustration, consider (30) below (cf. Chomsky 1995): 
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(30) *We want John to strike t that the problems are insoluble. 
As shown by (30), movement of John from its original Case-marked position is barred. Note 
that A-movement cannot take place from a Case position even when checking would 
otherwise fail in that position, as in (31): 
(31) *Shei seems to ti that Mary solved the problem.   
Although Nominative Case cannot be checked on she in its original site, movement of the 
pronoun to a position where Nominative Case is assigned is not permitted (see Martin 2001).  
      Third, a movement analysis of local anaphors raises empirical problems as well. Consider 
(32) below: 
(32) * John seems to himself that Mary solved the problem. 
On H’s theory, sentences such as (32) are predicted to be grammatical. In (32), no condition is 
violated under H’s assumptions: John gets a θ-role as the indirect object of the matrix verb, 
then raises to the matrix subject position where it is assigned Nominative Case. The 
Accusative Case assigned to the (prepositional) indirect object position is checked by the 
reflexive morpheme self. So it seems that all relevant features are checked in the course of the 
derivation of (32), yet the sentence is not acceptable. Note that under H’s movement 
hypothesis of local anaphors, the ungrammaticality of (32) cannot follow from θ-theoretic 
considerations: John does not lack a θ-role, as it is assigned a thematic role in the indirect 
object position. The derivation in (32) is also not blocked by the one in (33): 
(33) It seems to John that Mary solved the problem. 
The reason for this is that according to H, pronouns like it are not part of the lexical array, 
hence they are last resort grammatical formatives, inserted by the computational system only 
to save a derivation. H analyses movement – i.e. the formation of a reflexive – to be more 
economical than the insertion of a pronoun by the system (see section 2. 2. 4.). Consequently, 
(33) could only block (32) if the pronoun it was part of the array: in this case, merge of it 
would be preferred to the movement of John (for preference of Merge over Move, see 
Chomsky 2000). Let us now consider (34) below: 
(34) John seems to himself to favour his son’s drawing. 
How can we account for the asymmetry between (32) and (34)? In other words, given the 
ungrammaticality of (32), why is (34) acceptable? The only possible answer seems to lie in θ-
theoretic considerations: in (34), in contrast to (32), John can get a θ-role from the embedded 
predicate, raising from the infinitival subject position, whereas John in (32) cannot receive a 
θ-role. Therefore the ungrammaticality of (32) must follow from the fact that John lacks a θ-
role, which in turn shows that himself in (32) cannot be formed by the movement of John. 
Consequently, a movement analysis of reflexives cannot be adopted, hence Principle A and 
the distribution of anaphors cannot be reduced to movement. If local anaphora cannot be 
reanalysed in movement terms, however, the analysis of control as movement also becomes 
dubious, given the empirical similarities between the two phenomena (which H himself notes, 
as we have seen above). 
      The problems raised by the analysis of (29a-b) also cast doubt on a movement-based 
approach to sentences with inherently reflexive predicates such as (23), which is proposed by 
H because he assumes (23) to be a case of control, with a PRO subject occupying the 
complement position of the reflexive verb wash. The assumption that (23) involves control in 
turn may pose a question with respect to the viability of a null Case account of the distribution 
of PRO, as in (23) PRO would occur in a position other than [Spec, TP]. But do we really 
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need to posit PRO in sentences like (23)? In fact, there is an alternative account of structures 
involving reflexive verbs, proposed by Reinhart and Siloni (R&S) (2004, 2005). R&S argue 
that despite the considerable crosslinguistic variation in the array of reflexive verbs, 
reflexivization is essentially the same phenomenon across languages, and is adequately 
explained by a single parameter – that is, reflexivization is either a lexical or a syntactic 
operation in languages. In English, reflexivization applies in the lexicon; it is a reduction 
operation that affects (namely, reduces) the internal θ-role of a transitive verb, thereby 
producing a reflexive predicate which can assign only an external argument role. The 
operation also involves Case reduction: it eliminates the (Accusative) Case checking ability of 
the verb. Although at the level of syntax only the external θ-role is realized in these structures, 
they require a reflexive reading at the level of semantic interpretation.140 
      What follows from this analysis is that if indeed no internal argument role is mapped onto 
the complement position of a reflexive verb, there is no motivation for postulating PRO in 
that position – this in turn would also have the conceptual advantage that we can maintain the 
close link observed between the Case- and θ-marking of a nominal. 
      On the whole, it seems that H’s argument related to reflexive structures does not 
necessarily cast doubt on a null Case theory, whereas the proposed movement-based analysis 
of these constructions raises some problems that question the plausibility of such an account.  
2. 2. 3. A Featural View of θ-roles 
Let us now consider the stipulation that is crucial for H’s theory to be tenable, namely, the 
featural view of θ-roles. H takes θ-roles to be features on predicates that are checked by a 
nominal expression, whereby the θ-feature of the verb is transferred to the nominal. A θ-
feature on a predicate is able to license movement, hence (i) movement between θ-positions 
becomes possible, and (ii) (which follows from (i)) NPs are no longer restricted to bearing a 
single θ-role.  
      A-movement in OC structures is therefore motivated, on the one hand, by the θ-feature 
checking requirement of predicates, and on the other hand, by the Case-theoretic needs of the 
A-moved element. It is clear that such a movement analysis of control constructions is 
possible only if movement out of the embedded clause in control infinitivals is allowed, as is 
assumed by H in the case of OC structures. However, if we follow Chomsky (2000, 2001a) in 
positing that control structures are CP complements (in contrast to H’s analysis, which takes 
them to be TPs – see Hornstein 1999), and also adopt a phase-based view of grammar, 
movement out of an embedded control infinitival does not seem to be an option.141 For 
illustration, consider the derivation of (35a) (shown in (35b)) until the point when the 
embedded CP merges with its TP complement: 
(35) a. John tried to leave. 
       b. [CP [C ø] [TP John [T to] [VP John leave]]] 
John first merges with the embedded VP leave, thereby obtaining the leaver θ-role, then it 
raises to [Spec, TP] position to check the EPP feature of to. When the embedded CP is built, 
however, John has to raise from [Spec, TP] position to [Spec, CP], otherwise it is spelled out 
on the CP phase, and cannot raise further to the matrix [Spec, VP] position. Additionally, 
 
140 The analysis of reflexive derivations is indeed slightly modified in R&S 2005, where reduction involves the 
unification of the two θ-roles (an operation called ’bundling’ by R&S) associated with the nominal in the 
external argument position at the level of interpretation, forming the complex θ-role [Agent-Theme]. The 
reflexive verb assigns this one unified complex θ-role to the nominal in subject position. 
141 See Rizzi (1982) or Radford (2004) for evidence of the CP status of control infinitivals. 
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given the PIC, John is only accessible to a probe outside CP if it moves to [Spec, CP] 
position, the only position from which movement out of the CP phase is possible. This 
movement, however, requires John to move from an A-position (Spec-TP) to an A’-position 
(Spec-CP), which is not possible according to Chomsky (2005a). Prohibiting movement from 
Spec-TP to Spec-CP is crucial for Chomsky to derive the A/A’-distinction (see Chomsky 
2005a). 
      These considerations not only cast doubt on the plausibility of a movement-based 
approach to control, but may also prompt us to reconsider its conceptual foundations, in this 
case the assumption that θ-roles are features. The standard view of θ-roles, which is in effect 
the opposite of the featural view, is the configurational theory maintained by Chomsky (1995, 
2000, 2001a, 2001b). Under the configurational approach, θ-roles are radically distinguished 
from morphological features like Case and agreement; that is, θ-roles are not taken to be 
formal features, hence they cannot be checked and cannot license movement (in contrast to 
morphological features). This conception of θ-theory ensures that there is no raising to a θ-
position; rather, the θ-role of an argument "is determined by the position of first Merge" 
(Chomsky 2001a: 33), which means that θ-role assignment takes place in configurations of 
initial Merge of an argument NP. Specifically, Chomsky proposes the following principle (cf. 
Chomsky 2000: 103):  
(36) Pure Merge in θ-position is required of (and restricted to) arguments. 
(36) requires that arguments are first merged into a thematic position when they enter the 
derivation, and prohibits pure Merge (i.e. Merge that is not part of the operation Move) of 
arguments in non-θ positions – those positions can be filled by argument NPs only if they 
move there. For illustration, consider (37) below (cf. Chomsky 2000):  
(37) a. * I expected [t to be a proof discovered]. 
       b. I expected [there to be a proof discovered]. 
       c. I expected [a proof to be discovered]. 
The ungrammaticality of (37a) follows from the principle in (36): the NP I cannot be selected 
from the lexical array to check the EPP-feature of to, as in this case the initial Merge-position 
of the argument (Spec-TP) would be a non-θ position.142 The embedded [Spec, TP] position 
can only be filled by Merge of there (if the numeration contains the expletive), as in (37b), or 
by moving a proof, as in (37c). 
       To sum up: given the principle in (36), θ-roles cannot be assumed to be features. In other 
words, the configurational conception of θ-theory follows from (36): if an argument must 
receive its θ-role by pure Merge into a thematic position, then θ-roles are never assigned 
under Move, hence there is no movement to θ-positions, which in turn is inconsistent with a 
featural view of θ-assignment. 
2. 2. 4. NOC Constructions 
H argues that movement from the embedded infinitival subject position in NOC constructions 
is not allowed, hence what we find in these structures in that position is not an NP-trace left 
by A-movement. He assumes that the subject position in these infinitivals is filled by pro, the 
empty pronominal supposed to be licensed in the subject (and in some cases, the object) 
position of finite clauses in so-called null subject languages (NSL) like Italian. As we will see 
below, however, this analysis raises several problems. 
 
142 But see Hornstein, Nunes and Grohmann 2005 for an account of the ungrammaticality of sentences such as 
(37a) that does not resort to the θ-theoretic principle (36). 
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      First, as noted by Brody (1999: 216), "if pro, the empty pronominal exists, then why not 
PRO, an empty anaphor" – in other words, assuming the existence of a phonetically null 
pronominal, pro, needs as much empirical evidence and support as positing the existence of a 
null anaphor, PRO.  
      Second, H’s analysis crucially relies on the assumption that the subject position in control 
infinitivals is not a Case-checking position, as in this case movement from that position would 
be illicit in OC structures. That is why he holds that pro does not bear Case, but is able to 
check the relevant features of nonfinite I. This analysis, however, raises the conceptual 
problem already discussed in connection with PRO in section 1. 2.: pro is a nominal 
argument, receiving the θ-role of the embedded infinitival predicate, but in contrast with other 
nominal elements, it lacks Case under H’s theory. H explains this peculiarity of pro by 
postulating that only phonetically visible elements require Case. If we examine the properties 
of pro in NSLs, however, we will find that it seems reasonable to assume otherwise. Consider 
the Italian example below (cf. Chomsky 1982): 
(38) pro parla 
       ’he is speaking’ 
We have to suppose that in (38), pro is inserted with a full set of interpretable φ-features, 
otherwise there would be no element that could value the uninterpretable φ-set of finite I (see 
Holmberg 2005). Under current assumptions, Nominative Case is assigned to pro by I as a 
result of this Agree relation between pro and finite I. The Case-marking of pro in (38) is also 
supported by the fact that it occupies a Case position (i.e. the Spec position of finite I, 
associated with Nominative Case assignment). These considerations not only suggest that H’s 
explanation for why pro lacks Case in terms of phonetic visibility is inadequate, but also 
imply that a theory under which pro is Caseless cannot be correct.  
      Third, H’s analysis is in conflict with the Inclusiveness Condition. H assumes that the 
licensing of pro in NOC structures can be modelled on a par with the phenomenon of do-
support in English, that is, pro is not part of the lexical array selected to feed the derivation, 
rather it is a grammatical formative inserted by the computational system to save a derivation 
that would otherwise fail to converge. However, the assumption under which pro is not part of 
the array drawn from the lexicon violates the Inclusiveness Condition, which requires that "no 
new objects are added in the course of computation apart from rearrangements of lexical 
properties" (Chomsky 1995: 228). In other words, the Inclusiveness Condition bars the 
introduction of new elements during the derivation. H’s analysis of NOC constructions is 
clearly inconsistent with such a principle. 
      Another point that could be made is the following: for the MTC to be tenable, it is crucial 
to exclude the licensing of pro in OC constructions, which in principle is allowed, as pro can 
check whatever features nonfinite I bears in control infinitivals. For this reason, H introduces 
the assumption that movement (taking place in OC structures) is more economical than 
construal processes that apply in NOC structures, hence when movement is allowed to occur, 
it must occur (resulting in OC), and only when movement is barred do we get a NOC 
structure. Accordingly, H suggests that the application of construal rules is a costly last resort 
operation, blocked by economy conditions if movement alone can yield a convergent result. 
But why would movement be more economical than construal processes? Such an assumption 
in itself – without independent empirical motivation and support – is only an ad hoc 
stipulation, which, however, is essential for H to make his hypothesis work: without this 
stipulation, there would be nothing to prevent the licensing of pro in OC structures. However, 
it is not reasonable to adopt such theses without independent empirical justification. 
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      It is worth noting another point in connection with such economy considerations. The 
main thrust of the MTC is methodological: to reduce the inventory of empty categories, the 
types of rules, the class of assumptions, etc. that account for empirical facts in order to 
formulate simpler theories. This emphasis on methodological concerns motivates H to 
reconsider the phenomenon of displacement within grammar (i.e. that expressions are 
pronounced in one position and interpreted in another). Within GB, there are two rule types 
that are assumed to relate different positions within a sentence: movement processes and 
construal rules. H argues that economy considerations would favour only one rule type to 
account for displacement phenomena. In other words, we should explain all instances of 
displacement in a unified manner: either any case of displacement is movement, or any case 
of displacement is construal. As a result, we should dispense with either construal processes 
or movement, thereby allowing a reduction within the inventory of grammatical operations. 
Given that movement operations are supposed to be ineliminable, H claims that we should 
dispense with construal rules, which should rather be analysed as movement. But such a 
reduction is possible only if it is empirically viable, in other words, only if we can account for 
all the properties of the relevant constructions without resorting to construal processes in our 
explanation of the empirical facts. That does not seem to be so in the case of the MTC, 
however: to account for what kind of operation – if not movement – relates PRO (pro under 
H’s analysis) to its antecedents John and Mary in the NOC structure in (39), H has to 
postulate the existence of some sort of construal operation that establishes a co-reference 
relation between these elements (cf. Hornstein 2003). 
(39) John1 told Mary2 that PRO1+2 leaving each other was important to Bill. 
If that is indeed the case, it is plausible to suppose that not only movement processes are 
ineliminable, as H assumes, but also construal rules. What else could explain the fact that the 
relevant expressions in (39) (i.e. PRO, John and Mary) are interpretively related to each 
other? In other words, there must be some kind of interpretive construal rule by which the 
relevant positions are related within a sentence if movement is barred. It seems, then, that the 
inventory of rule types is not reduced under the MTC: we cannot completely eliminate 
construal rules from the grammar, as we still need them to properly account for the properties 
of certain constructions. Put differently, if we need both rule types (construal and movement) 
to adequately explain empirical phenomena, we cannot reduce the class of rules only on the 
ground that such a move would be methodologically preferable. Consequently, grammar does 
not become more simplified in this respect on the MTC. 
      A further argument against the analysis of NOC structures can be formulated in 
connection with the last resort nature of pro under the analysis. H assumes that pro is not part 
of the lexical array and is only inserted by the computational system in order to save the 
derivation if all other grammatical alternatives fail. H, however, extends this analysis to overt 
pronouns, presumably for the following reasons: 
(i) The null hypothesis is that all pronouns, either overt or phonetically null (like pro), 
have the same properties and behave similarly. This entails that if the empty 
pronominal pro is supposed to be introduced by the computational system only as a 
last resort option to yield convergence, in principle we have to assume that all 
pronouns can be analysed on a par with pro, hence that no pronouns are part of the 
numeration. 
(ii) H wishes to eliminate the Binding Theory from UG, and once Principle A is dispensed 
with (see section 2. 2. 2.), then, methodologically, the status of Principle B also 
becomes dubious; in fact, once Principle A is done away with, Principle B should also 
be eliminated. This said, H aims to reduce not only the distribution of local reflexives 
 184 
to the theory of movement (in that they are analysed as the residue of A-movement), 
but also that of pronouns: bound pronouns – just like pro – are supposed to occupy 
positions from which movement is not allowed.  
(iii) Once local anaphors are analysed as the residue of A-movement (i.e. as spelled-out 
NP-traces), and pronouns are analysed on a par with pro, the fact that pronouns and 
anaphors are in complementary distribution follows straightforwardly. In other words, 
the relation of anaphors to pronouns can be modelled on the relation assumed to obtain 
between OC and NOC structures. This means that when movement is possible and 
Case is checked, what we get is a local reflexive; when movement is barred and Case 
is checked, the computational system inserts an overt pronominal. This analysis entails 
that the use of reflexives is more economical and hence preferred over the use of 
pronouns, as reflexives are formed via movement. 
For the above reasons, H is forced to extend the last resort analysis of pro to overt pronouns, 
under which pronouns are "not true lexical expressions but are grammar internal 'elsewhere' 
formatives which are costly to use but licensed if needed" (cf. Hornstein 2001: 152). This 
analysis, however, as we will see below, fails both conceptually and empirically, and 
consequently, it also casts doubt on an analysis of pro in these terms. 
      Let us now consider H’s analysis of (40a-c) below (cf. Hornstein 2001): 
(40) a. Everyone likes himself. 
       b. *Everyonei likes himi.  
       c. Everyonei likes himj. 
(41) {everyone, likes, assorted functional material} 
The lexical array selected for the derivation of all the sentences is shown in (41) – H assumes 
that neither self nor the pronoun him is part of the lexicon, and their use is not permitted 
unless needed for the derivation to converge. H argues that the unacceptability of (40b) 
follows from the fact that the derivation of (40a) is more economical than that of (40b), hence 
is preferred by UG. The reason for this is that (40a) is formed by movement, which, on H’s 
assumptions, is more economical than the insertion of a pronoun by the computational system 
in (40b). In other words, the convergence of (40a) blocks the derivation of (40b) by means of 
an economy restriction: when movement is allowed to occur (as in (40a)), it must occur. On 
this account, the derivation of (40c) should be blocked by the more economical derivation that 
yields (40a). That this is not so is explained by H with the suggestion that the use of deictic 
pronouns (as in (40c)) is allowed as they support a stress feature.  
      Under the account of (40a-b), the complementary distribution of local reflexives and 
bound pronouns is straightforwardly derived, just as in the case of the OC-NOC distinction. 
Nevertheless, it seems that bound pronouns and anaphors do not always occur in 
complementary distribution, as shown by the acceptability of both (42a-b) below: 
(42) a. Johni wondered which picture of himselfi Bill liked. 
       b. Johni wondered which picture of himi Bill liked.   
Both the reflexive himself in (42a) and the bound pronoun him in (42b) are coreferential with 
John in the matrix subject position, and they occupy the same position within the two 
sentences. How can we account for the empirical facts in (42) on H’s assumptions? In fact, 
given sentence pairs such as (42a-b), H’s analysis of reflexives/bound pronouns fails 
empirically. The reason for this is the following: as we have seen above, H takes movement 
(i.e. the licensing of reflexives) to be more economical than the use of pronouns, which is 
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derivationally costly, hence when a derivation can converge without the use of a pronoun, its 
use is forbidden. From this it follows that the convergence of (42a) should block the 
derivation of (42b), as (42a) is a more economical derivation, and consequently, it is preferred 
by UG, whereas (42b) should be barred by economy conditions. Thus, H’s theory predicts that 
(42b) is unacceptable, since it is blocked by the convergence of the more economical 
derivation in (42a). Additionally, an assumption under which the reflexive himself is formed 
by movement in (42a) also seems to be problematic, as it occurs inside a wh-island out of 
which in principle no constituent can be moved. 
      Indeed, the empirical data in (42) shows that we cannot assume that the licensing of 
reflexives is cheaper than the use of pronouns, which is therefore barred whenever movement 
(i.e. the formation of a reflexive) is possible. Consequently, pronouns cannot be supposed to 
be last resort expressions which are added to a derivation only at a cost, hence an assumption 
under which pronouns are not part of the lexical array is untenable. Methodologically, this 
casts doubt on a last resort analysis of pro – why would the properties of phonetically null 
pronominals be so diverse from that of overt pronouns? On the null hypothesis, we have to 
assume that the empty pronoun pro is part of the array if that is the analysis that seems to be 
correct in the case of overt pronouns. If this is so, however, then what prevents the licensing 
of pro in OC constructions? If pro is part of the lexical array that feeds the derivation, and is 
able to check whatever features nonfinite I bears in OC structures, then nothing precludes pro 
from being licensed in OC structures. This in turn entails that we have no evidence for the 
existence of movement within OC, hence that an analysis of control in terms of movement 
cannot be correct. 
      Besides this empirical failure, a conceptual problem also emerges in connection with the 
analysis of (40a-b): why would the use of reflexives be more economical than the use of 
pronouns? As we have seen above, the reason for this according to H is that reflexives are 
formed via movement, which is more economical than the insertion of a pronoun by the 
computational system, which is derivationally costly, as pronouns are last resort expressions 
that are not part of the lexicon, permitted only if required for convergence. But let us now 
consider the steps involved in the formation of the reflexive in (42a) (shown in (43a)) and the 
pronoun in (42b) (shown in (43b)): 
(43) a. himself: - insertion of self by the computational system (self merges with John) 
                         - movement of John (after which the copy is deleted) 
                         - insertion of the pronoun him by the computational system (to support self) 
       b. him: -insertion of the pronoun him by the computational system 
As (43a) shows, the licensing of the reflexive himself involves at least three steps. Movement 
is just one component of the process of reflexive-formation: for a reflexive to be licensed, the 
computational system has to introduce a non-lexical expression in the course of the derivation 
two times – once the reflexive morpheme self and later on in the derivation the pronoun him. 
In the formation of the pronoun him (shown in (43b)) only one step is involved: the system 
adds the non-lexical formative him to the derivation. As we can see in (43), the insertion of 
the pronoun him is only part of the process of reflexive-formation, i.e. only a suboperation 
applied in the licensing of the local reflexive, whereas in the case of the formation of the 
pronoun, that same single step suffices. Why, then, should we assume that the licensing of 
reflexives is more economical than the use of pronouns? Such an assumption appears to be 
quite problematic, as the licensing of reflexives clearly involves not only more steps than 
pronoun formation, but it also contains pronoun insertion only as a subpart. In fact, given 
these considerations, we may conclude that it is pronoun insertion which is more economical, 
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and not the formation of reflexives. Evidently, therefore, a theory under which the use of 
reflexives is more economical than the use of pronouns is untenable on conceptual grounds as 
well. What does that entail for H’s analysis? Consider once again (40a-b), repeated here as 
(44a-b): 
(44) a. Everyone likes himself. 
       b. *Everyonei likes himi.  
Given the above concerns, we surely cannot account for the contrast in (44a-b) in the manner 
proposed by H: the reason for the complementarity observed in the distribution of local 
anaphors and bound pronouns in sentence pairs such as (44) can no longer be explained in 
terms of an economy condition. How to account, then, for the complementary distribution of 
the reflexive and the pronoun in (44)? It seems that we can only resort to the binding 
principles. This implies that we cannot completely eliminate the Binding Theory, and cannot 
reduce it to the theory of movement: the binding principles must be retained in some form to 
account for the facts in (44a-b). But if the Binding Theory cannot be reanalysed in terms of 
movement processes, a reanalysis of control as movement also becomes dubious. This follows 
from the significant empirical parallels observed between local anaphors and OC which 
require that the two phenomena are treated parallelly, i.e. accounted for by the same principles 
and mechanisms of grammar. 
      To summarise, a close examination of H’s analysis of NOC constructions has shown that 
it fails both conceptually and empirically. This in turn calls the MTC into question, as we 
have seen. 
2. 3. Conclusion 
Given the considerations above, we may conclude that the MTC has proven to be problematic 
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. H’s theory would require the adoption of 
assumptions that are unattractive from a conceptual perspective and are not motivated on 
strong empirical grounds (such as the last resort nature of pro or the conception of θ-roles as 
features). Additionally, the empirical arguments H proposes in favour of his movement theory 
(wanna-contraction phenomena and control with reflexive verbs) are not valid, as we have 
seen. The discussion above therefore indicates that H’s PRO-less account in terms of 
movement has not been found to be preferable to a PRO-ful account of the syntax of control 
infinitivals. In fact, the problems that the MTC raises make it untenable. 
 
Chapter 3: A Recent Minimalist Analysis of PRO 
Let us now return to the alternative treatment of control structures: a PRO-based theory of 
control, possibly along with the null Case theory. This section discusses a recent minimalist 
analysis of the distribution-of-PRO problem that seems feasible. 
      The minimalist view of PRO that emerges from Chomsky 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2005a, 
2005b is as follows: the hypothesis is that derivations proceed by phases, which are taken to 
be CP and transitive vP. Control infinitivals are analysed as CP complements, hence as 
syntactic objects constituting a phase. Within the phase-based computation, the two phase 
heads C and v are the operative elements, driving all operations. It is the phase heads C and v 
that are the true locus of tense and agreement. This means that the phase head C is inserted 
from the lexicon with a full set of uninterpretable φ-features, interpretable Tense and 
uninterpretable EPP-features (or edge feature in Chomsky 2005a), whereas T lacks these 
features in the lexicon. These features can be detected on T only if it is selected by C. 
Consequently, T inherits these features from C, and it serves "as a probe only derivatively by 
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virtue of its relation to C" (cf. Chomsky 2005a: 20). In this sense, C and T operate as a unit in 
inducing agreement. The φ-features that T inherits from the phase head C are 
uninterpretable/unvalued (i.e. not assigned a value in the lexicon), hence they must be valued 
and deleted for the derivation to converge. Uninterpretable features are eliminated from the 
derivation by the operation Agree, which establishes a matching relation between the 
uninterpretable φ-set of a probe P and the interpretable φ-features of a goal G, the result of 
which is deletion of the uninterpretable φ-features of P and structural Case assignment of G 
by P. Turning to control T, its uninterpretable φ-set serves as the probe that seeks a matching 
element with interpretable φ-features that could value the uninterpretable φ-set of the T head. 
The φ-features of nominals are complete and interpretable, hence capable of valuing the 
uninterpretable φ-set of a functional head. By assumption, then, the probe in T locates the 
nominal element PRO in [Spec, VP] position as goal (which must be assumed to be part of the 
lexical array, in compliance with the Inclusiveness Condition). This entails that PRO bears a 
full set of φ-features so as to be able to value the uninterpretable φ-set of control T, which is 
also complete. For Agree to apply, both probe and goal must be active, i.e. both probe and 
goal must have an uninterpretable feature. In our case, control T is rendered active by its 
uninterpretable φ-set, whereas PRO has to be assumed to bear an uninterpretable Case feature 
that activates it (so that it can establish an agreement relation with a functional head). Under 
the operation Agree induced by φ-feature matching between PRO and control T, the 
uninterpretable φ-features of T are valued and erased. By hypothesis, structural Case on 
nominals is deleted under a φ-agreement relation between the nominal and a functional head, 
and the Case assigned to the nominal depends on the probe it agrees with: finite T is 
associated with Nominative Case, v with Accusative, and control T with null Case. 
Accordingly, as a result of the φ-agreement relation between PRO and control T, the 
uninterpretable Case feature of PRO is valued and deleted, i.e. PRO is assigned null Case by 
the T head. The Agree relation between PRO and control T presumably involves the raising of 
PRO to [Spec, TP] position, so that the uninterpretable EPP feature of T is deleted. 
      How is PRO excluded from raising and ECM infinitivals? Chomsky takes these structures 
to be TPs, selected by V. The T head of raising and ECM infinitivals is defective (Tdef), i.e. 
not φ-complete, bearing only a partial φ-set, presumably only the uninterpretable feature 
[person] and an EPP feature. A defective probe is unable to assign a value to the 
uninterpretable Case feature of a nominal; only a φ-complete probe (like control T) is able to 
delete the Case feature of a matched goal. For this reason, successive-cyclic movement 
through the specifier position of Tdef is possible: as the structural Case feature of the nominal 
reaching that position is not deleted, it remains active, hence it can undergo further movement 
and agreement. Movement of the infinitival subject in raising and ECM constructions to 
embedded [Spec, TP] position therefore leads only to partial agreement between the head Tdef 
and the raised nominal, with Tdef matching the nominal in only the feature [person]. The 
nominal in Spec-Tdef position values and deletes the uninterpretable [person] feature of Tdef 
and its EPP feature. The defective T head, however, cannot delete Case in the nominal, which 
raises further to matrix subject position in raising structures, or to [Spec, vP] position in ECM 
constructions where it is assigned Accusative Case. Given these considerations, PRO is not 
allowed to occur in raising and ECM infinitivals, as its Case feature could not be valued by 
Tdef. 
      The above implementation of the null Case theory does not face the conceptual and 
empirical problems posed by Martin’s conception of null Case assignment, and it seems to 
provide a principled explanation for all the structures under consideration. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Some Residual Issues 
In this paper, I sought to answer two closely related questions. Question (i) is concerned with 
the distribution-of-PRO problem: can we adequately account for all the distributional 
properties of PRO? For any theory which posits the existence of PRO, it is crucial to be able 
to do so. It seems that recent developments in minimalism provide us with the analytic tools 
and theoretical apparatus required to explain the distributional features of this empty element, 
yielding an account of PRO in terms of the null Case theory. This account does not face the 
empirical and conceptual problems of previous approaches to the distribution-of-PRO 
problem. Question (ii) is related to the fact that within MP, methodological concerns in terms 
of economy, simplicity, parsimony etc. have become standards in theory evaluation. These 
considerations are manifested in the MTC, which dispenses with PRO, and analyzes control 
as movement. An investigation of such an analysis has shown that it is both theoretically and 
empirically inadequate, hence must be rejected. 
      The two questions above raise the following issue: does PRO have a place in grammar? 
This paper argues for a positive answer. We may conclude that a PRO-ful null Case-theoretic 
analysis is superior to other alternative accounts of the syntax of control infinitival 
constructions. 
      As regards the minimalist theory of null Case, which serves to explain the distributional 
properties of PRO, let me suggest a possible avenue for further research. Recent work by 
Cecchetto and Oniga (C&O) (2004) points to empirical evidence from Latin and Italian which 
they claim proves that PRO carries standard structural Cases like Nominative or Accusative 
rather than a special null Case. Specifically, C&O argue that PRO always shares Case with its 
controller. They base their argument on Latin examples such as (45) and (46) below (cf. 
Cecchetto and Oniga 2004): 
(45) Ego volo [PRO esse bonus]. 
       I (NOM) want PRO to be good (NOM) 
(46) Ego iubeo te [PRO esse bonum]. 
       I order you (ACC) PRO to be good (ACC) 
(47) Ego sum bonus.  
       I (NOM) am good (NOM) 
In Latin, subject NPs overtly agree in Case, number and gender with the predicative adjective 
in copular structures, as shown by (47). C&O argue that as the adjective shows Nominative 
agreement in (45), PRO must be assumed to bear Nominative Case as well, agreeing in Case 
with the adjective. According to C&O, that is expected if PRO shares Case with its controller, 
which occupies the matrix subject position and bears Nominative Case. On similar grounds, 
PRO is supposed to be Accusative in (46), as its controller is Accusative as well – this is again 
justified by the overt Accusative agreement on the adjective. If that is the case, however, PRO 
cannot bear null Case, as two Cases cannot be checked on a single nominal. 
      An assumption under which PRO can carry the standard structural Cases raises several 
issues. Just to mention one: if PRO can bear Nominative or Accusative Case, what explains 
the unacceptability of sentences like (48a-b), where PRO occupies a Nominative and an 
Accusative Case position? 
(48) a. *PRO saw John. 
       b. *John saw PRO. 
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(49) *John tried Mary to leave. 
Note that the ungrammaticality of (48a-b) cannot be accounted for by suggesting that the φ-
features of PRO are not full, hence cannot value the uninterpretable φ-set of finite T. This 
would pose a problem with regard to the valuation of the complete φ-set of the T head in 
control infinitivals. As regards (49), it is also predicted to be acceptable on the assumption 
that standard structural Case is checked in the subject position of control infinitivals.  
      We could also attempt to find an explanation for the empirical facts in (45) and (46) under 
the null Case approach. To overcome the problems posed for a null Case theory by these Latin 
examples, it may be suggested that the Phase Impenetrability Condition does not bar Case 
agreement between the adjective and the controller of PRO. This is possible if we suppose 
that the Case of the adjective is not valued through the usual Case checking procedure by a 
functional head, rather it only morphologically reflects the Case properties of the associated 
nominal element, hence its Case is valued through a concord relation with this nominal. We 
may suppose that PIC is not valid for Case agreement of this type. For this analysis to be 
tenable, we also have to assume that PRO does not block the agreement relation between its 
controller and the adjective by intervening between them. This seems reasonable, as PRO is 
not a PF object, hence, in principle, should not be a blocking category. There may be other 
options to deal with the empirical data above, but I leave these issues for further research. 
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